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At the limits of spatial governmentality:
a message from the tip of Africa
STEVEN ROBINS
ABSTRACT Urban studies scholars drawing on Foucault’s analysis of govern-
mentality have investigated how urban social orders are increasingly more
concerned with the management of space rather than on the discipline of
offenders or the punishment of offences (Merry, 2001). This paper examines the
‘rationality’ and efficacy of spatial governmentality in post-apartheid Cape
Town, and shows how the city has increasingly become a ‘fortress city’ (Davis,
1990), much like cities such as Los Angeles, Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro. These
‘global cities’ are increasingly characterised by privatised security systems in
middle class suburbs, shopping malls and gated communities (Caldeira, 1999).
These spatial forms of governmentality draw on sophisticated security systems
comprising razor wire and electrified walls, burglar alarms and safe rooms, as
well as vicious guard dogs, neighbourhood watches, private security companies,
and automated surveillance cameras. On the other side of the race and class
divide are urban ghettoes characterised by growing poverty and everyday
violence. These socio-spatial inequalities continue to be reproduced despite
urban planning initiatives aimed at desegregating the apartheid city. Although
the media and the middle classes highlight the dangers of crime and violence,
they tend to ignore the structures of inequality that fuel the growth of crime
syndicates and violent drug economies that are reproducing these urban
governance crises. Given the diminished resources of the neo-liberal state, the
policing of middle class residential and business districts is increasingly being
‘outsourced’ to private security companies. In working class neighbourhoods of
Cape Town such as Manenberg, the state has attempted to re-establish
governance by resorting to new forms of spatial governmentality. The paper
draws attention to the limits of these attempts to assert state control through the
management of space. Spatial governance in places like Manenberg will continue
to be relatively ineffectual given existing levels of social inequality and racial
polarization. Such processes are reproduced by massive unemployment and
racialised poverty resulting from socio-spatial legacies of apartheid and Cape
Town’s shift from a manufacturing to a tourist,  IT and financial services
economy. Although this paper focuses on attempts at re-establishing governance
in a crime and gangster-ridden working class neighbourhood of Cape Town, it
addresses these issues in relation to city-wide shifts to new forms of spatial
governmentality after apartheid.
Steven Robins is in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of the Western Cape,
Private Bag X17, Belville, Cape Town 7535, South Africa. E-mail: SROBINS@UWC.AC.ZA.
STEVEN ROBINS
Major elements of instability in the neoliberal scenario [include] the downward trend
in corporate taxes and the inability to finance common goods, nationally and
globally … Without taxation, no infrastructure. Without taxation, no proper
education, no affordable health care. Without taxation, no public sphere. Without a
public sphere, no legitimacy. Without legitimacy, no security. This in itself is a
familiar future scenario. It could take the form of global ‘Californianization’ while
California is being ‘Brazilianized’. A world of gated communities, high barbed-wire
fences, steep hierarchies, robots on the workfloor and at the gate, and automated
surveillance all around. A world of creeping privatization of public space, as in Los
Angeles (cf. Mike Davis’ City of Quartz (1990). A ‘post-human’ world … of which
we see one face in Blade Runner and other cinematic dystopias. (Nederveen
Pieterse, 2000: 11)
Cape Town’s city managers and planners imagine their city’s future as a globally
competitive city with advanced IT and financial service sectors, and a booming
tourism industry with world-class hotels and convention centres, a Californian
dreamscape at the tip of Africa. Although the ‘Californianization’1 of Cape Town
is indeed taking place, it seems to be replicating itself less as Africa’s Silicon
Valley than as a fortress city of gated communities (Caldeira, 1996: 2000), ‘zero-
tolerance’ policing, community policing strategies (eg neighbourhood watches,
commandos and vigilante groups), private security companies, automated
surveillance cameras,2 high barbed-wire fencing and vicious guard dogs on one
side of the divide, and urban ghettoes of racialised poverty and violence on the
other (Davis, 1990; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000). After apartheid, the black ‘town-
ships’ of Cape Town have become even more segregated and disconnected from
the ‘white’ middle class parts of the city. In a context of rising levels of crime and
violence, the townships are perceived by middle class suburban residents to be
even more dangerous and ‘unruly’ than they were under apartheid.
Despite concerted city-wide planning initiatives aimed at desegregating the
apartheid city, the everyday socio-spatial legacies of apartheid continue to be
reproduced: middle class Capetonians seldom venture near the townships and
fears of ‘black crime’ continue to fuel a booming security industry and a fortified
architecture of fear in the leafy middle class suburbs and shopping malls (Davis,
1990). While the media and the middle classes regard the unacceptably high
levels of crime and violence as an indication of a severe crisis of governance,
there is a loud silence on the role of neoliberal policies in reproducing the
conditions of poverty and unemployment that sustain these violent economies.
With the limited state resources available for policing, as in so many cities in
the North, the policing of middle class residential and business districts is
being outsourced to private security companies, resulting in new forms of spatial
governance (Merry, 2001). Although this paper focuses on attempts at re-
establishing governance in a crime- and gangster-ridden working class neigh-
bourhood of Cape Town, it addresses these issues in relation to city-wide shifts to
forms of ‘spatial governmentality’.
Sally Merry (2001: 16) writes that whereas ‘modern penality is largely
structured around the process of retraining the soul rather than corporal punish-
ment, recent scholarship has highlighted another regime of governance: control
through the management of space’. According to Merry (2001: 16–17):
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New forms of spatially organized crime control characterize contemporary cities,
from the explosion of gated communities (Caldeira, 1999), to ‘prostitution free
zones’ as a regulatory strategy for the sex trade (Perry and Sanchez, 1998: Sanchez,
1997) to ‘violence free zones’ as a way of diminishing communal conflict in India.
Spatialized strategies have been applied to the control of alcohol consumption
(Valverde, 1998) and the regulation of smoking … New community-policing
strategies towards youth emphasize moving potentially criminal youths to other
areas rather than prosecuting them (Ericson and Haggerty, 1999: 169). These are all
examples of new regulatory mechanisms that target spaces rather than persons. They
exclude offensive behavior rather than attempting to correct or reform offenders.
The regulation of space through architectural design and security devices is
generally understood as a complement to disciplinary penality but fundamentally
different in its logic and technologies (Ewick, 1997; Shearing and Stenning, 1985;
Shields, 1989; Simon, 1988; Valverde et al, 1999).
This paper seeks to understand the implications for democracy and citizenship of
new forms of spatial governmentality that contribute to socio-spatial exclusions
in an already highly segregated apartheid city. Spatial governance and the
privatisation of public space seem to emerge in contexts of increasing racial and
class polarisation and rising unemployment and poverty. These governance
initiatives are also taking place in contexts in which the contracting and retreating
neoliberal state (and its security apparatus) is increasingly helpless in the face
of dramatically escalating levels of violent crime and social disorder. This is
exacerbated by the fact that large sections of the urban underclass do not seem to
buy into the liberal democratic values of citizenship, given their limited access
to economic and political rights in a context of jobless growth and structural
unemployment. It will become clear in the following pages that these develop-
ments have placed enormous obstacles in the way of attempts by the South
African state to re-establish governance following decades of state violence and
systematic race and class inequalities under apartheid.
While political violence and the bloody civil war of the 1980s have all but
dissipated, everyday violence and criminal activity continue unchecked. Given
this bleak scenario, it is hardly surprising that the South African state is
struggling to re-establish governance after apartheid. Neither is it surprising that
ordinary citizens have lost faith in the capacity of the police and judicial system
to stem the tide of lawlessness and violence that has swept across the country.
This crisis in governance is particularly evident in South African cities, where
urban governance cannot rely on traditional liberal democratic notions of
‘trusting citizens’ and ‘trustworthy’ government, but rather on an urban social
order built upon a combination of systems of punishment, discipline and security
(Merry, 2001). In parts of Cape Town, this form of governance, which is
constantly under attack from heavily armed and sophisticated crime syndicates,
relies upon the micro-management of urban space. When it is successful, as in
the historically white middle class parts of some South African cities, spatial
governance usually involves a range of exclusionary practices, including the
exclusion of ‘offensive behaviour’ and people, usually the poor and homeless,
who look dangerous or disorderly.
In the absence of resources for surveillance cameras and private security
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beyond the fortified walls of middle class suburbs and shopping malls, the state
continues to struggle to re-establish governance in ‘unruly’ black and ‘coloured’
townships.
When anti-apartheid planners and activists sought to render the townships
ungovernable during the 1980s, they could not have anticipated how difficult it
would be to re-establish governance after apartheid. Now the proverbial chickens
have come home to roost and the ANC government is struggling to push back the
tidal wave of crime, violence and lawlessness. By means of a case study that
focuses on innovative attempts by the City of Cape Town Municipality (CCTM) to
establish governance in Manenberg, a working class ‘coloured’ community, I will
draw attention to the structural dimensions of the ‘governance question’. This
will involve locating the crisis in governance within the context of a shift to a
service economy that has undermined traditional manufacturing and textile
sectors that used to provide jobs to residents of working class communities such
as Manenberg. Governance problems in places such as Manenberg, I argue, are
exacerbated by these macroeconomic policy shifts.
A governance crisis at the tip of Africa
The spate of infant rapes in December 2001 shocked even the most hardened
South Africans used to living in a society characterised by extraordinarily high
levels of criminal violence and violence against women.3 South African citizens
increasingly call on the post-apartheid state to adopt tougher measures to combat
crime, including the reintroduction of capital punishment. Meanwhile those
disillusioned with lack of capacity of the police and judicial system have resorted
to community policing strategies including gated communities, para-military
rural commandos, neighbourhood watch structures and the formation of vigilante
groupings such as PAGAD, Amadlosi and Mapogo. Despite populist calls for the
reintroduction of the ‘kangaroo courts’ and people’s justice of the 1980s, the ANC
government remains committed to the rule of law and to liberal democratic
principles and procedures of governance.
At first glance the chaotic and violent character of post-apartheid (un)civil
society seems to conform to media and scholarly representations of African states
and societies as fundamentally ‘dysfunctional’ and ungovernable. For instance,
we have recently witnessed the emergence of a growth industry in academic
accounts of ‘kleptocratic’, ‘criminal’ and authoritarian African states (Bayart et
al, 1999). These scholarly representations of African states reproduce media
stereotypes of Africa as a ‘basket case’ continent doomed to human disasters
including famine, war, endemic corruption, coups, genocide, AIDS, and so on. The
most recent expression of this academic trend has been the writings of François
Bayart et al (1999) and others who focus on the bizarre and grotesque rituals of
African state power and ‘the politics of the belly’ (Mbembe, 1992; Bayart, 1993).
At times this literature appears to mimic the exoticism of traditional anthro-
pological topics such as witchcraft. Most of these studies revel in these cultural
and political ‘pathologies’ without locating such phenomena within the political
economy of underdevelopment. It appears that the ‘cultural turn’ ushered in by
the post-cold war hegemony of post-structural and postmodern theory has
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valorised a ‘new exoticism’ that focuses on witchcraft, kleptocratic states and
criminal syndicates while obscuring any reference to the economic relations of
underdevelopment and the more mundane material dimensions of everyday life
in Africa.
It would seem that any understanding of the rise in occult and religious move-
ments and criminal violence in post-apartheid South Africa requires locating
these developments within the context of recent shifts in the economy. For
instance, the loss of well over half a million jobs between 1994 and 2000, largely
as a result of liberalisation policies and the shift to a lean neoliberal state,4 has
become a catalyst for the dramatic expansion of associational life and informal
economies, including religious and occult movements, savings associations, lotto
and pyramid schemes, international drug cartels and crime syndicates, anti-crime
vigilante groups, informal taxi organisations, and so on (see Comaroff &
Comaroff, 1999; 2000).5
It will become clear in the Manenberg case study discussed below that the
massive growth of gangs and drug trafficking in working class townships of Cape
Town is indeed symptomatic of these broader political and economic processes.
These post-apartheid developments cannot be understood without taking
into account the impact of the introduction of the neoliberal ‘contract state’
characterised by privatisation, outsourcing, public–private partnerships (PPPs) and
‘downsizing’ and ‘rightsizing’ initiatives. Neither can state interventions in urban
governance be understood without reference to shifts from manufacturing to
service economies.
How ‘civil’ is civil society in the ‘liberated zones’?
During the anti-apartheid struggle, terms such as ‘civil society’, ‘community’ and
‘the townships’ conjured up images of virtuous and heroic working class black
and ‘coloured’ people resisting apartheid state repression. The progressive and
democratic connotations attached to these conceptions of community were
periodically called into question by the violence of ‘kangaroo courts’ (or people’s
courts) , and the ‘necklacings’ and brutal slayings of alleged impimpis
(informers). Nonetheless,  the political actions of these communities were
generally valorised and lionised by the anti-apartheid movement, as well as by
the more liberal voices within the mass media and the international community.
Such conceptions of ‘community’ as an unmitigated ‘social good’ have, however,
come under scrutiny during the post-apartheid period. The undemocratic, illiberal
and at times violent practices of chiefs, warlords and shacklords, as well as of
community-based vigilante groups such as Mapogo, Amadlosi and People
Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), have drawn attention to the Janus-faced
character of the politics of ‘community’ after apartheid. This has also drawn
attention to the limits of the post-apartheid state’s attempt to render the townships
governable.
Numerous cases of ‘mob justice’ have been reported in the press in recent
years. Newspaper reports on the stoning to death of suspected thieves and rapists
by angry crowds of crime-weary residents of black townships draws attention to
what is becoming increasingly commonplace. The following caption refers to one
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such vigilante killing in one of Cape Town’s black townships: ‘Gruesome justice
… Shocked residents stare in horror at the body of a suspected thief who was
pelted with stones, attacked with sjamboks and everything the enraged members
of the mob could lay their hands on’ (City Press, 7 October 2001). The report
noted that in less than a month three people had been stoned to death in separate
incidents by angry crowds of residents in Cape Town’s Philippi and Khayelitsha
townships. From the perspective of the ANC government, these activities pose a
serious challenge to liberal notions of democracy and the rule of law. The strong-
arm tactics and violent patronage politics  of some community leadership
structures—for instance, civics, Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP)
forums, ward committees, street committees —have also compromised notions of
democratic practice and citizen participation. Clearly, community-enforced forms
of punishment and discipline are taking place alongside the kind of spatial
governmentality characterised by high walls, guard dogs, private security
companies, surveillance cameras and policed shopping malls.
During the height of the anti-apartheid struggle in the mid-1980s, the liberation
movements and community-based organisations had sought to render the town-
ships ungovernable and create ‘liberated zones’. The post-apartheid period,
however, has witnessed concerted efforts by the state to reassert spatial gover-
nance and control over what are now seen as ‘unruly townships’. To this effect
the ANC government and the Department of Safety and Security have actively
encouraged the formation of Community Policing Forums as well as neighbour-
hood watches. The state’s sanctioning of these community policing structures has
largely been a response to government recognition that it does not have the
capacity and resources to deal with the massive explosion of criminal and gang
activities in South African cities (see Steinberg, 2001; Comaroff & Comaroff,
forthcoming).6 This shift to community policing can be seen as a form of
‘outsourcing’ of policing functions by a neoliberal state unable to address crime
on its own. It also draws attention to the state’s acknowledgement of the need to
reclaim governance in poor communities.
The state has encountered countless problems in its attempts to ‘reclaim the
townships’. These problems include urban land invasions, high levels of crime
and violence, and the non-payment of rental, rates and levies for water and
electricity. One of the most serious problems faced by the state is how to deal
with ‘informal’ and illegal activities that are increasingly sustained by a political
economy of criminal syndicates and gangs involved in drug trafficking and other
illegal activities.  Working class communities are no longer the romanticised
spaces of heroic resistance to apartheid. Instead, many of these poor communities
have become unruly spaces of dysfunction and disorder from the perspective of
the state. The case study below focuses on the attempts by the Department of
Community Development (Devcom) of the City of Cape Town Municipality
(CCTM or ‘Council’) to re-establish governance in Manenberg, a ‘coloured’
working class community classified as ‘dysfunctional’ by senior city officials.
This was to be done through a variety of interventions, including the introduction
of individual home-ownership, ‘oil spot’ strategies of policing and crime pre-
vention, and the ‘hardening’ and protection of public facilities. In other words,
significant aspects of the Council’s intervention involved what Sally Merry
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(2001) refers to as ‘spatial governmentality’.
The Manenberg case study suggests that communities with weak governance
structures and poor policing capabilities can become a nightmare in which
citizens are terrorised by warlords, shacklords and gangsters. It was precisely
such a scenario that plagued Devcom’s urban renewal programmes. Residents
told me of the physical dangers involved in having to navigate competing gang
territories to access trains, taxis and Council facilities such as schools, the clinic,
the library or housing office (see Salo, forthcoming). The clinic, for instance, had
to be relocated to a classroom in a Manenberg school because it was situated in
the middle of a gang battlefield. It was therefore hardly surprising that the
Council identified the re-establishment of governance in Manenberg as a priority.
A Manenberg Task Team was established ‘to address the precipitous circum-
stances that staff faced in delivering services with particular reference to Manen-
berg’. The task team was mandated ‘to follow a course of action that ensures (1)
staff safety and security (2) staff receive maximum emotional and psychological
support, (3) that plans to ensure service delivery be put in place’.7 The attempt to
secure Council facilities and create safe public spaces proved to be more difficult
than was initially anticipated. Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of these
governance issues, however, it is necessary to situate Manenberg within the
broader socio-spatial order of the apartheid city.
‘Fortress LA’ at the tip of Africa? Spatial governance after apartheid8
The race and class divide between Cape Town’s historically white inner city and
southern suburbs on the one side, and the black and ‘coloured’ townships on the
other, remains firmly intact in the new South Africa. By removing blacks and
coloureds from multiracial working class inner city neighbourhoods such as
District Six in the 1960s and 1970s, and relocating entire communities to
outlying Cape Flats townships such as Manenberg and Gugulethu, apartheid
planners created the racialised grids of the apartheid city. The relocation of
communities to Council flats on the ‘Cape Flats’ represented a first wave of
modernist social engineering. While this housing scheme was an integral part of
apartheid segregationist planning, recent housing development schemes
discussed below have been ‘progressive’ interventions aimed at reforming the
social and spatial fabric of fragmented and ‘dysfunctional’ communities shattered
by unemployment, everyday violence and the devastating legacies of the forced
removals of the 1960s and 1970s.
The template of the ‘postmodern’, post-apartheid city could seamlessly settle
upon the spatial order produced by this earlier wave of apartheid social engineer-
ing. In recent years the historically white, middle class parts of contemporary
Cape Town have witnessed a massive expansion of gentrification, mega-develop-
ments, heritage and tourist sites, and spectacles of consumption such as the
Victoria and Alfred Waterfront and the Cavendish Square, Tygervalley and
Century City mega-shopping malls-cum-recreation centres. These relatively new
spaces of capital investment contrast starkly with the poverty, wastelands, and
desolation of the racially segregated black townships of the Cape Flats. These
racialised geographies of post-apartheid Cape Town reproduce the spatial logic of
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capital under apartheid despite the dramatic political reforms of the 1990s. The
black and coloured working classes remain trapped in places of extreme poverty
located at a considerable distance from middle class (mostly white) centres of
commerce, tourism and consumption. This socio-spatial divide is reproduced
through investment strategies that tend to steer clear of the dangerous and
desolate spaces of the Cape Flats ghettoes. A multi-million-rand surveillance and
security sector ensures that these (mostly white) middle class neighbourhoods
and shopping malls are defended against what is perceived to be a dangerous
underclass ‘Other’.9
Since the April 1994 democratic elections levels of gang-related violence in
working class neighbourhoods in the Cape Flats have escalated on an unprece-
dented scale. The dramatic growth in the mid-1990s of PAGAD vigilantism has no
doubt contributed to the ‘tit for tat’ killings on the Cape Flats. During the first
half of 1998 over 60 drug- and gang-related killings took place on the Cape Flats,
contributing towards an undeclared war between gangs and PAGAD.10 The ‘City
Fathers’ (sic) and tourist entrepreneurs panic every time this gang violence spills
over into ‘white spaces’ of tourism and consumption. This has intensified the
militarisation of city life through an architectural semiotics of ‘defensible space’,
thereby transforming Cape Town into a smaller version of ‘Fortress LA’ (Davis,
1990). In this process of fortification, control over defensible space becomes the
major concern for both rich and poor. The urban poor of the Cape Flats lack the
means to command and defend space, and generally find themselves trapped in
dangerous spaces.11 These neighbourhoods are dangerous precisely because
the need continuously to appropriate and defend space tends to result in the
violent expulsion of unwanted elements, for example enemy gang members and
outsiders. As David Harvey reminds us:
Fine-tuned ethnic, religious, racial and status discriminations are frequently called
into play with such a process of community construction. Since ownership of even
the basic means of reproduction (such as housing) is restricted, the main way to
dominate space is through continuous appropriation. Exchange values are scarce,
and so the pursuit of use values for daily survival is central to social action. This
means frequent material and interpersonal transactions and the formation of very
small scale communities. With [the formation of] community space, use values get
shared through some mix of mutual aid and mutual predation, creating tight but
often highly conflictual interpersonal social bonding in both private and public
spaces. The result is an often intense attachment to place and ‘turf’ and to an exact
sense of boundaries because it is only through active appropriation that control over
space is assured. (Harvey, 1985: 261)
These low-income townships are also spaces in which the state perceives an
urgent need to intervene, both to contain contagious social ills (from sex work to
tuberculosis) and to pacify and control what are often seen to be violent,
dangerous and unruly populations. The demolition and relocation of ‘unhygienic
slums’ has been a standard measure of control over the ‘dangerous underclasses’
in South African cities and elsewhere in the world. According to Harvey (1985:
261), within this spatialised scenario the state tends to be seen by the under-
classes as a repressive external agency rather than a resource that is controllable
and beneficial. This spatialised class warfare continues to shape the post-
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apartheid urban landscape.
By contrast, the more affluent middle class can command space through spatial
mobility and ownership of the basic means of reproduction, for instance houses
and cars (Harvey, 1985: 261). In addition, the (mostly white) middle classes have
the means to protect and fortify their suburban homes with vicious dogs, high
walls, the latest alarm systems, and a proliferation of private security firms. Since
the affluent are generally economically self-sufficient they do not need to
command space through continuous appropriation and neither do they need
street-level interpersonal relations and neighbourhood networks in order to meet
their basic needs. Instead, their common interests and concerns generally revolve
around a need to maintain the standards and property value of the built environ-
ment through a shared commitment to common conceptions of taste, tone,
aesthetic appreciation, and symbolic and cultural capital (1985: 262). Since
money provides access to the communities and necessary resources, these are
less exclusionary communities (in terms of ethnicity and race) and tend to have
diffuse and fluid boundaries. Given this scenario it is not surprising that the state
is seen to be both beneficial and controllable, providing security and assisting in
keeping undesirables out.
In this contemporary scenario of class warfare and the militarisation of
everyday life, public space is destroyed in order to insulate, spatially and socially,
the middle classes from undesirable Others. For instance, in new mega-structures
and supermalls street frontage is designed in ways that consciously exclude the
underclasses and street persons, and hawkers, strollers, and street people are
often evicted from shopping malls by private security guards always on the
lookout for non-consumers who might disrupt public consumption. Meanwhile
those who live in South Africa’s urban ghettoes find themselves socially and
spatially imprisoned in repressive and bloody war zones where their security and
safety can no longer be guaranteed by a state financially hamstrung by cutbacks
brought about by neoliberal fiscal austerity measures. Given this privatisation of
the policing of public places, it is only the wealthy who are able to afford the
services of private security firms, while the poor remain easy targets of gang and
criminal violence.
In Cape Town, tourism and the service industry have become key sectors
within a ‘mega city’ economy that is both globally connected and internally
divided into middle class white spaces of wealth generation, consumption and
recreation, and black and coloured areas characterised by poverty and lack of
resources. These socio-spatial legacies of the apartheid city are being reinforced
by strategies of capital investment and accumulation whereby mega-shopping
malls and recreation centres are located near middle class white suburbs and
business centres at great distances from informal settlements and ‘coloured’ and
black ghettoes. The location of these business investments serves to reinscribe
the spatial logic of the apartheid city, and to subvert attempts by progressive
planners to desegregate the city by bringing business investment and infra-
structure closer to the historically black areas. In other words, while the ‘city
state’ claims that it is committed to undoing and dismantling the racialised grids
of the apartheid city, national and global capital undermines these plans by
continuing to flow to white, middle class parts of the city. What this means is that
673
STEVEN ROBINS
the ‘coloured’ and African working class and the unemployed continue to be
confined within under-resources spaces of poverty and everyday violence that
are at great distances from the fortified middle class spaces of consumption,
recreation, tourism and business. These processes are also reinforced by a state
that is unwilling or unable to intervene in land markets, thereby reproducing
apartheid planning practices that locate low-incomes black housing development
at the southwest periphery of the city where land is cheapest. The following
section discusses spatial governance and planning in the making and unmaking
of the apartheid city.
Spatial governance—the planner’s fetish? The making and unmaking of
District Six and Manenberg, Cape Town
Manenberg was established as a ‘Coloured township’ following the 1960s and
1970s Group Areas Act-forced removals from District Six and other ‘white’ parts
of Cape Town. The design of ‘coloured’ working class townships such as Manen-
berg was based on Ebenezer Howard’s ‘garden city’ model, with blocks of flats,
terraced and semi-detached houses, and a standardised architecture (Pinnock,
1989). Situated 15 kilometres from Cape Town’s city centre, Manenberg is
spatially isolated from adjacent black and coloured townships by means of high-
ways, mainroads, railway lines and green belts and buffer strips (Jensen &
Turner, 1996: 83–85; Le Grange & Robins, 1997). These socio-spatial legacies
continue to have a profound influence on the shape of Cape Town after apartheid.
Planners of South African cities drew inspiration from Le Corbusier ’s
‘Surgical Method’ in their attempts to radically reconfigure the urban landscape.
They appear to have shared Le Corbusier’s faith in rationally conceived ‘master’
plans and urban designs that would create social order by means of ‘proper’
zoning of land use and the segregation of different social groups. In the name of
social order and racial harmony, South African urban planners appropriated Le
Corbusier’s notion of planning as a rational, technical process that could be
divorced from politics. It is worth quoting at length from Norman Hanson’s intro-
ductory remarks made at the 1938 Town Planning Congress in Johannesburg:
It is possible to achieve this radical reorganization by drastic methods only, by
a fresh start on cleared ground. This ruthless eradication directed towards a
revitalizing process we haves, following Le Corbusier’s lead, named the Surgical
Method … through surgery we must create order, through organization we must
make manifest the spirit of a new age, (Hanson in Pinnock, 1989: 156, cited in
Jensen & Turner, 1996: 85)
This utopian faith in the capacity dramatically to transform ‘disorderly’ urban
environments reflects the thinking of influential planners and architects going
back to Baron Haussmann’s mid-19th century renovation of Paris, and Ebenezer
Howard’s ‘Garden Cities’.12 These ideas emerged in the 19th century in response
to the problems of social disorder and threats to public health that came to be
associated with the working class neighbourhoods of industrial cities of the
British Victorian age. These planning interventions all share the assumption that
it is possible radically to redesign the built environment in ways that improve the
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social fabric of ‘dysfunctional’ communities and neighbourhoods. In other
words, planners believed, and continue to believe, that social behaviour could be
strongly influenced by urban form. This case study draws attention to the limits
of such ‘physicalist’ thinking, which continues to animate post-apartheid
planning discourses. This will involve interrogating some of the underlying
assumptions and urban planning in relation to questions of housing, built
environment and citizenship and governance.
Starting from the premise that ‘houses are much more than bricks and mortar’,
the following discussion examines the micro-politics and development discourses
of housing and urban renewal in Manenberg following the 1999 tornado that
swept through this coloured working class neighbourhood. Manenberg was
described by City of Cape Town officials as ‘dysfunctional’ using indicators such
as the extraordinarily high levels of criminal and gang violence, tuberculosis,
substance abuse, the prevalence of teenage pregnancies and domestic violence.
The Manenberg case study shows how housing interventions are often deeply
embedded in ideological conceptions of ‘development’ that seek to create good
governance and virtuous consumer-citizens out of the raw material of bricks,
mortar and ‘the unruly masses’.13 It will become clear that, despite claims to the
contrary, low-income housing and urban planning in South Africa have always
been ideologically charged, and planners, policy makers, city managers and
activists have engaged with urban development interventions in relation to these
politically charged questions of race, ethnicity, citizenship and governance.
Housing citizens in the Cape of Storms
In August 1999 a tornado swept through the working class ‘townships’ of the
Cape Flats in Cape Town. The destruction was particularly devastating in Manen-
berg, a ‘coloured’ neighbourhood known for its gang violence and for being the
headquarters of Rashied Staggie’s Hard Livings gangs.14 Manenberg constantly
features in the media as a space of ‘social pathology’ and dysfunctionality, a
representation that is reproduced through almost daily violence and gang killings.
It is also associated with the highly militaristic and hierarchical prison gangs such
as the ‘28s’ and ‘26s’ that have in recent years transformed themselves into
sophisticated corporate structures connected to multinational drug cartels and
crime syndicates such as ‘The Firm’, the Hard Livings and ‘the Americans’.
Drug trafficking, alcohol sales and distribution, gun-running, taxis and sex work
are the major sources of revenue of this multibillion-dollar industry. With its
extremely high levels of unemployment and poverty, Manenberg has become a
ripe recruiting ground for the foot soldiers of the drug kingpins, the merchants
and hitmen.
It was within this scenario that the CCTM planners, policy makers and senior
managers identified Manenberg as one of Cape Town’s six ‘zones of poverty’
that required ‘special treatment’.15 The devastation unleashed during the tornado
provided a unique opportunity to intervene in the social fabric and spatial design
of Manenberg. A CCTM senior manager was quoted in the press as saying that the
tornado was a godsend, as the destruction of blocks of Council flats controlled
by the gangs would allow the Council to redesign the social fabric and built
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environment from scratch. The Devcom in the City of Cape Town (CCT)16 was
responsible for the implementation of the tornado rebuild and urban regeneration
programmes in Manenberg. In line with statutory development frameworks, CCT
defined its major tasks as: (1) to re-establish governance in a gang-ravaged part
of Cape Town; (2) to bring marginalised citizens into the mainstream market
economy; and (3) to create the conditions for citizen participation in everyday
political life (Vawda, personal communication; see also Chipkin, forthcoming).
One of Devcom’s key strategies was to use individual ownership of low-
income houses as a means towards rebuilding moral and political community and
breaking the stranglehold of gangs that controlled many Council rental flats
(‘Courts’). A key element in this strategy was to replace rental housing with
individual home ownership. Council flats were perceived to reproduce the
conditions of welfare dependency that contributed towards the disintegration of
the nuclear family, which was deemed responsible for systemic social problems
in Manenberg. Devcom’s line of argument was that the Manenberg community
was ‘dysfunction’ because family units tended towards disintegration and were
therefore unable to socialise youth into adulthood (see Chipkin, forthcoming;
Salo, forthcoming). In other words, Devcom’s task was to create the conditions
for ‘proper’ governance and citizenship in what was deemed to be a ‘dys-
functional’ community.
In attempting to combat the gangs and Manenberg’s social problems, the
Council drew on the purportedly positive attributes of individual home owner-
ship. This was seen to be part of a strategy to help poor and working class
citizens break out of a ‘culture of poverty’ and dependency that was perceived to
be reproduced through rental housing, which in turn was seen to be part of an
apartheid-created state welfare system. In addition, senior city managers argued
that 90% of tenants of the Council flats were in arrears with their rental
payments,17 and gangs often controlled access to the flats through patronage
networks. In addition, key policy makers and senior managers within the Council
argued that home ownership and the creation of a secondary housing market
would draw poor people into the mainstream economy by assisting them to gain
access to financial credit. It would also encourage home owners to contribute
towards the improvement of their neighbourhoods, thereby increasing the value
of their property. It was also envisaged that home ownership would strengthen
the positive parenting role of the nuclear family, and in particular of female
household heads. The latter were identified as socially responsible citizens—the
economic and moral backbone of the community—who consistently paid the
Council for the services they consumed (Vawda, personal communication).
The ANC Council attempted to re-establish governance as a necessary condition
for citizen participation in public life in Manenberg. However, rather than resort-
ing to a conventional policing solution to Manenberg’s governance crisis and
social problems, Devcom sought to address these problems by creating the
conditions for the participation of marginalised citizens and poor communities in
the mainstream economy and public domain. This objective was to be achieved
through a variety of Council interventions in Manenberg, including ensuring
safer access to Council facilities such as libraries, clinics and the housing office.
Devcom Director Ahmedi Vawda argued that large numbers of Manenberg
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residents were involved in daily interactions with Council officials in the clinics,
libraries and housing offices, and that these interactions were crucial for re-
establishing governance. Yet during 1998 gang violence in Manenberg had
resulted in the closing down of all Council facilities for extended periods. This
ongoing situation of gang violence and disruption undermined the Council’s
developmental initiatives.
Other Council interventions included the ‘hardening’ of Council buildings to
protect traumatised staff exposed to daily gang violence. Council planners also
attempted to create safer public spaces and secure flat courtyards by means of
walls and barriers that functioned as obstacles to the free movement of
‘strangers’ into flats and housing estates. In addition, in attempting to bring local
government ‘closer to the ground’, Devcom helped establish area-based manage-
ment systems whereby senior CCTM managers engaged directly with community
leaders and local residents on Area Coordinating Teams (ACTs) that were respon-
sible for conveying information and development priorities and plans to senior
management structures and vice versa.
Spatial warfare on the frontline
The fieldwork for this paper took place at a time of serious crisis in Manenberg.
The devastation of the August 1999 tornado had left hundreds homeless, and
gang violence was on the increase. By November 2000 seven Manenberg
children had died in the crossfire as a result of gang shootouts in the area. In
addition, as a result of many years of unrelenting gang shootings and violence,
the Council staff at the libraries, clinic and housing offices were suffering from
acute forms of psychological trauma and stress disorder. A City of Cape Town
Community Development Report, dated 3 February 1998 stated that ‘there is a
potential collapse of service provision in libraries, child care, health and housing
in Manenberg, [and] gang violence is having a direct impact on service delivery’.
The report went on to call for ‘urgent attention and a course of action to
physically protect staff and ensure emergency support is available’. This resulted
in the ‘hardening’ of the library, clinic and housing office buildings at the cost of
hundreds of thousands of rands. Meanwhile, many Council staff who were
receiving trauma counselling were unable to cope with the extraordinarily high
levels of stress and everyday violence in Manenberg. In addition, despite the
fortification of Council buildings, in early 2000 the housing office and clinic,
which were situated in the nerve centre of Hard Livings territory, were relocated
to safer territory. The relocation in turn led to accusations from residents and
from NGO and Community Based Organisation (CBO) representatives that the
Council was more concerned about its buildings and its staff, who were virtually
all non-residents of Manenberg, than about the ordinary residents who had to face
these harsh conditions of everyday violence on an ongoing basis.
The local politics surrounding the closure and subsequent relocation of the
clinic was extremely volatile. At numerous community meetings, residents and
civic activists complained vociferously about the closure of the clinic. Council
representatives were told that the elderly and sick now had to walk greater
distances through dangerous rival gang territories to get to the relocated clinics.
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In response, staff mobilised their union representatives to convince the Council
that their hazardous work conditions constituted a violation in terms of labour
legislation. Clinic staff brought ‘Sydney’, a hitman for the American gang, to a
community meeting to convince Dr Ivan Toms, a senior manager in the health
services, that his staff were in serious physical danger if they went back to the
original clinic site. Sydney told Dr Toms and others present at the meeting that ‘I
shoot at the clinic everyday. You can’t take the staff back there. They’re not safe.’
The Director of a Manenberg-based NGO understood the controversy surround-
ing the clinic to be the result of the fact that the clinic staff were regarded by
gangsters and residents as outsiders: ‘They’ve isolated themselves from the
community. They are fearful of these people and act superior towards them. They
tend to be arrogant and look down on residents. This makes them targets for
abuse and intimidation. Municipal workers, the garbage collectors and so on,
walk through Manenberg everyday and they don’t encounter the same problems.
Its all about class, status and attitudes.’18 In other words, the social distance of
Council staff from the community has bred local animosity towards them. From
the perspective of the Council, however, there was a legally defined obligation to
do everything in its power to protect intimidated and traumatised clinic, library
and housing office staff.
Devcom’s Ahmedi Vawda envisaged the provision and upgrading of com-
munity facilities such as libraries, community centres and computer laboratories
as a central component of a strategy aimed at diverting youth from the dangerous
streets to the safety of learning environments. This was perceived by Vawda to be
in line with Cape Town’s urban development strategy aimed at preparing youth to
enter the new information economy with its growth sectors in IT and financial
services. However, everyday violence in Manenberg presented serious obstacles
to this strategy of promoting the growth of the knowledge industries. The
excerpts from the daily diary kept by the Manenberg Library staff since January
1993 (see Figure 1) provide some indication of the levels of everyday violence
that spill over into Manenberg’s schools and libraries. Although I have arbitrarily
selected a few months in 1993 and 1994, similar patterns and levels of violence
are evident for all the years detailed in the diary (January 1993–August 2000).
The chief librarian told me that he had started the diary initiative when he
became convinced that official police statistics were hopelessly inaccurate and
seriously underestimated the levels of violence and killings in Manenberg.
Given this context of daily gang violence, it is perhaps not surprising that
Manenberg came to be represented in the media and in policy documents as a
place of ‘social pathologies’, ‘dysfunctionality’, violence and trauma. What is
less self-evident is how and why senior managers within the Council came to
conceptualise individual home ownership and the creation of a secondary
housing market as the panacea for these problems of social order and gover-
nance. What is clear, however, is that many Manenberg residents were them-
selves calling for the ANC Council to intervene more directly in eradicating gang
activities and creating housing opportunities and the improvement of the physical
environment.19
As was mentioned, this pressure on the Council to address the realities of gang
violence also came from frontline Council staff who were thoroughly traumatised
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by their experiences of everyday violence. A Community Development report to
the CCT Executive Committee dated 2 March 1998 spelt out the implications of
the ‘Manenberg Crises’:
There is a potential collapse of service provision in libraries, child care, health and
housing in Manenberg … The gang violence in the township (which often spills
over into the adjacent townships) is having a direct impact on the service delivery
locations. It has disrupted the provision of services, placed staff lives in danger and
is cause for distress amongst staff such that they are traumatized, unable to work
and, in instances, not wanting to return to work. It requires urgent attention and a
course of action to physically protect staff [and] ensure emergency support is
available … The situation in Manenberg and Hanover Park has reached a dangerous
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FIGURE 1. Excerpts from the Manenberg Library diary.
JUNE 1993
14: Borrower robbed in front of library.
17: Staff member’s car was vandalised.
22: Borrower robbed at library entrance.
28: Stones thrown through windows.
JANUARY 1994
26: Heavy shooting, gun battle between gangsters and policemen station at
police mobile station in front of library. Two staff members risked their lives
to close the front door.
27: Shooting in front of library at 5.15pm.
28: Mobile police station was withdrawn by police.
FEBRUARY 1994
1: Shooting in front of library—forced to close library. Managed to get staff out
of the area safely.
4: Gang fight outside library. Number of shots fired (11.48am). Mobile police
station returns—heavily barricaded.
7: Shooting at 5.12pm in front of library. Man shot through the head. Killed instantly.
8: Women caught in crossfire. Shot in chest.
11: Advised by police to clear out of the area—unsafe situation.
25: Man shot at shops next to library. Was brought to police caravan.
Sat bleeding there.
28: Policeman stationed at the mobile police station. Urgently requested staff to






15: Library reopened after almost four months. Stones thrown against windows.
28: Heavy stone throwing.
29: Stone throwing continues …
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point where the very existence of law and order, good governance, a stable social
environment and healthy working conditions have all but become impossible.20
Another CCT Report drew attention to the ‘sporadic gunfire’ near the housing
office during the month of April 2000. Despite almost daily shootings outside the
housing office, it was open for most of the month.21 It was within this context of
daily violence that the Council decided to relocate the housing office and clinic.
These serious threats to good governance, service delivery and safety and
security led to a variety of Council interventions including the ‘hardening’
(fortification) of Council premises and identification of safe rooms, the develop-
ment of communication networks (the ‘buddy system’) and trauma support for
staff, the provision of bleepers and panic buttons, the provision of safe trans-
portation of Council staff in and out of the area, and the development of risk
management strategies, disaster management, alternative service provision and
contingency plans in case of the breakdown of services as a result of gang
violence.22 Given the extraordinary levels of everyday violence in Manenberg,
and the Council’s responsibilities to protect its staff as well as ordinary citizens,
the Council was clearly obligated to intervene in order to ‘re-establish gover-
nance’. However, Devcom’s ‘hardening’ of Council buildings and the use of
housing delivery to re-establish governance failed adequately to take into account
the structural dimensions of a political economy of drugs and gang violence.
So what kind of state and state intervention would have been necessary to re-
establish governance in Manenberg?
States of surveillance and control?
James Scott’s highly influential book, Seeing Like a State, published in 1998,
attempts to understand statecraft as a process of rendering populations ‘legible’.
Scott argues that this has been achieved through a series of disparate state
practices of surveillance and control, including sedentarisation, the creation of
permanent names, the establishment of cadastral surveys and population
registers, the invention of freehold tenure, the standardisation of language and
legal discourse, the design of cities and the organisation of transportation. These
practices have functioned ‘as attempts at legibility and simplification’.
Much of early statecraft seemed similarly devoted to rationalizing and standardizing
what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and administratively more convenient
format. The social simplifications thus introduced not only permitted a more finely
tuned system of taxation and conscription but also greatly enhanced state capacity.
They made possible quite discriminating interventions of every kind, such as public-
health, political surveillance, and relief for the poor. (p 3)
Scott concludes that these state interventions tend to fail because they are
designed and implemented as top-down, standardised packages that ignore the
complexity of informal social processes. Nonetheless these state technologies of
surveillance and control appear to have had some successes in the advanced
capitalist countries of the North. It is less clear, however, to what degree they
have been effective in colonial and postcolonial countries in the developing
world.
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This question is taken up in Timothy Mitchell’s Colonizing Egypt (1998).
Mitchell draws on a Foucaultian analysis of the modern disciplinary state to
investigate new forms of colonial state power based on the re-ordering of space
and the surveillance and control of its occupants. According to Mitchell, the
Panopticon and similar disciplinary institutions were developed and introduced
in many instances not in France and England but on the colonial frontiers of
Europe, in places like Russia, India, North and South America, and Egypt. Nine-
teenth century Cairo, for example, provided an excellent opportunity to establish
a modern state based on the new methods of disciplinary powers, including
military  reform, the supervision of hygiene and public health, compulsory
schooling, agricultural reforms involving controls over movement, production
and consumption, and the rebuilding of Cairo and other Egyptian towns and
villages to create a system of regular, open streets that were conducive to surveil-
lance and control (Mitchell, 1998: x).23
James Scott, Tim Mitchell and Foucaultian analyses of development discourse
more generally (see Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990), tend to emphasise the
omnipotence of state discourses and the docility of subject-citizens, who appear
in these writings as passive victims of an all-encompassing modern state
apparatus. The Manenberg case study, however, draws attention to problems with
Foucaultian analyses of disciplinary institutions and the surveillance state. Every-
day life in ‘unruly’ places such as Manenberg draws attention to the limits of
state power and control, for example by highlighting the agency and resistance of
citizens who are exposed to state interventions. In other words, these are anything
but the docile subject-citizens assumed in much Foucaultian analysis.
The Manenberg case study draws attention to the limits of attempts by senior
city managers and planners to use individual home ownership and urban spatial
design to achieve the following objectives: (1) to re-establish governance and
create law abiding citizens, thereby undermining the power of the gangs; (2) to
break down ‘social pathologies’ and a ‘culture of poverty’ reproduced by high
levels of unemployment; and (3) to intervene in the socio-spatial grids of the
apartheid city in order to promote integration between Manenberg’s ‘coloured’
population and black African residents of the adjacent township of Gugulethu.
Devcom strategists assumed that it would be possible to re-establish gover-
nance and improve the neighbourhood through a combination of individual
home ownership and urban spatial design innovations. For instance, one of the
problems identified with Manenberg’s flats was that gangsters had open access
through the courtyards, and gangsters chased each other through the courtyards
on a daily basis. Walls and barriers were subsequently built around existing flat
courtyards and new houses in order to limit access to outsiders. The planners’
over-emphasis on physical form and spatial design, however, did not take into
account the structural dimensions of the political economy of gang violence.
Neither has this spatial design approach countered the socio-cultural dimensions
of gang culture by addressing the ‘distinctive milieus for social interaction from
which individual [gang members] derive their values, expectations, habits and
states of consciousness’ (Harvey, 1985: 118).24
These CCTM senior managers and planners believed that home ownership and
spatial design alone could make a significant contribution towards re-establishing
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governance in Manenberg. But the Cape Town Housing Company (CTHC) scheme
that was introduced in Manenberg was challenged by community activists,
poorer residents and illegal sub-tenants and backyard shack-dwellers who were
initially excluded from the scheme.25 The liberal individualist conception of the
‘consumer citizen’ (or ‘citizen-consumer’) clashed with deeply embedded com-
munity structures, neighbourhood and gang networks, and communal
solidarities of residents, especially the poorer sections of the community. Com-
munity activists claimed that the Council was undermining community interests
and ‘community-consciousness’. The Council’s attempt to create a ‘new citizen
identity’ through home ownership was bound to encounter obstacles given the
political economy of gangs, drug trafficking and everyday violence in Manenberg.26
The structural dimensions of gang violence and ‘dysfunctional’
communities
Within this scenario of high unemployment, poverty, violence and gangsterism in
Manenberg the Council decided to replace the badly damaged Council flats with
individually owned homes. This ‘rent-to-buy’ housing scheme aimed to use the
‘positive social values’ attributed to individual home ownership as a means of
overcoming the social pathologies associated with Council rental housing and
public housing estates in the Cape Flats. In terms of CCTM thinking, home owner-
ship would facilitate the creation of a secondary housing market and the improve-
ment of the built environment, thereby acting as a catalyst for urban regeneration
programmes. In other words, it was believed that housing development could
contribute towards improving the built environment and the social fabric and
moral economy of Manenberg. The CCTM scheme was not only concerned with
the moral economy. It was also widely believed that the establishment of a
secondary housing market would kick-start a cycle of upward mobility through
the creation and expansion of poor people’s investment in their asset base (Edgar
Pieterse, personal communication). This would in turn stimulate the local
economy and increase the rates base.27 In other words, along with safety and
security projects and economic development programmes, housing would
become a key catalyst for a systemic programme of urban regeneration.
The following CCTM definition of the problem, terminology and principles for
urban renewal and regeneration highlights the approach of Devcom:
Urban renewal is understood to be about changing the physical environment,
whereas urban regeneration implies a rebuilding of both the physical and social
environment. It is imperative that we have a common definition and understanding
of urban regeneration and its related strategies. Where such strategies need to be
implemented there must be a community understanding of the following: the
physical environment; the social factors and degree of dysfunctionality within
a particular community; the service delivery environment, what resources are
available and how it is being used … The following principles should provide the
foundations of an urban regeneration programme: rebuild community confidence;
re-establish governance; focus on integrated co-operative governance, establish a
service delivery strategy via Area Co-ordinating Teams, establish Area Based
Project Management … recognize livelihood strategies in communities in con-
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tributing to local development. (Community Development Report, Urban
Regeneration, 24 October 2000)
One of the major problems with the Council’s housing model and the urban
renewal programme was that these were predicated upon a liberal individualist
conception of the ‘consumer citizen’ (or ‘citizen-consumer’) that clashed with
locally embedded community networks and communal identities, especially
among the illegal sub-tenants, backyard shack-dwellers and poorer residents who
were initially excluded from the scheme. The Manenberg Disaster Committee
(MDC), a civic organisation that emerged in response to the 1999 tornado,
challenged the Council’s housing scheme by claiming that it ran counter to
community interests. In other words, the Council’s attempt to create a ‘new
citizen identity’ through home ownership came to clash with civic activists
claiming to defend neighbourhood solidarities and the interests of poor and
marginalised residents of Manenberg.
The Council’s Devcom encountered numerous obstacles in its attempts to
introduce urban renewal by re-establishing governance and incorporating
marginalised citizens into the mainstream economy and political life. It appears
that the Council’s senior managers and planners did not properly understand the
political and economic structures that reproduced poverty, crime, violence and
‘dysfunctional’ patterns of behaviour associated with places like Manenberg. In
other words, Council management and officials failed fully to understand and
acknowledge the structural and institutional obstacles to attempts to re-establish
governance and incorporate ‘the poor’ into the market economy.
For decades the Council has been dominated by engineers and planning
technocrats for whom the provision of basic services (eg water, electricity and
refuse collection), rather than community development, has been the Council’s
core business (Vawda, personal communication). This technicist perspective,
however, failed to fully appreciate the social and political implications of Cape
Town’s drug economy, gang violence and unemployment for governance and
service delivery. As a result, the Council was unwilling and unable to address the
impact of growing unemployment resulting from recent shifts from a traditional
manufacturing economy to a service sector economy focusing on tourism, the
film industry and IT and financial services.28 Instead of addressing the implica-
tions of these job losses, CCTM senior management and the private sector
celebrated the fact that, in the first 10 months of 2001, R7 billion had been
poured into huge building projects in central Cape Town (Sunday Times, 11
November 2001). This fitted in with private sector and Council fantasies of
establishing Cape Town as a globally competitive service economy replete with
international convention centres and five-star hotels, business and recreation
centres and mega-shopping mall developments. None of these developments is
likely to provide significant numbers of jobs to people living in Manenberg and
other working class Cape Flats townships.
As a result of these recent economic shifts, the formal economy is increasingly
unable to provide employment to poorly educated and unskilled residents of
neighbourhoods such as Manenberg. By contrast opportunities do seem to
exist for those willing and able to participate in the violent economies of drug
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trafficking, protection, extortion, crime, sex work and the taxi industry. While
most gang members in Manenberg comprise young men who spend their days
fighting over women and vaunting their masculine pride and reputations for
toughness, their activities are tied to the recruitment of dealers and merchants
into massive drug operations that are based in other parts of the city, for instance
Greenpoint and Sea Point. In addition to these very real economic opportunities,
the lure and glamour of gang culture is also fuelled by urban mythologies
surrounding notoriously wealthy and powerful Hard Livings gangsters such as
the Staggie brothers. Notwithstanding attempts by the Council to re-establish
governance and spatial governmentality through the creation of safe public
spaces, these initiatives continue to be undermined by this political economy of
crime, violence and unemployment.
Conclusion
This article has argued that attempts by the city authorities to re-establish gover-
nance in Manenberg failed because of the inability of the state to address growing
unemployment in an urban environment characterised by a thriving drug and
gang economy involving sex work, crime, protection syndicates, and a booming
tax industry associated with violence and gang control over transportation routes.
This failure to re-establish governance occurred despite concerted efforts by
city planners and officials to spatially engineer the built environment through
the establishment of individual home ownership housing schemes and the
‘hardening’ and protection of key government buildings such as clinics.
The contestation between the state and gangs over control of space in Manen-
berg is part of a broader process in terms of which current investment strategies
and urban development schemes have avoided poor areas of the Cape Flats,
thereby reproducing the socio-spatial inequalities of the apartheid city. Despite
the many well intentioned interventions by the city authorities, the socio-spatial
logics of the apartheid city persist. Investors and businesses continue to gravitate
towards the well policed, historically white, middle spaces of the city. These
parts of Cape Town have indeed been incorporated into a representation of Cape
Town as a globally competitive, multicultural city driven by the tourism industry
and the IT and financial service sectors. There are, however, at least two other
sides to Cape Town. One side is the ‘fortress city’ of middle class neighbour-
hoods characterised by gated communities, neighbourhood watches, vigilantes,
private security companies, surveillance cameras, high walls and barbed-wire
fences. The other is the urban ghettoes of the Cape Flats, characterised by
racialised poverty, crime and violence.
Post-apartheid Cape Town remains a deeply divided city, with middle class
enclaves fortified against black African and ‘coloured’ townships that are
perceived as dangerous ‘no-go zones’. It is within this highly polarised urban
landscape that spatial governmentality has become such contested terrain. New
forms of spatially organised crime control that characterise contemporary Cape
Town include a proliferation of gated communities, and numerous initiatives
aimed at creating prostitution- and crime-free zones through the use of closed
circuit television cameras and ‘zero-tolerance policing’. Even graffiti artists have
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found themselves the targets of this new urban war against ‘grime’. As Merry
(2001: 16) points out, ‘these are all examples of new regulatory mechanisms that
target spaces rather than persons [and that] exclude offensive behaviour rather
than attempting to correct or reform offenders’. The urban renewal programme
introduced in Manenberg following the destruction caused by the tornado in 1999
represented such an attempt to regulate space through architectural design,
individual home ownership and security devices. These initiatives were meant to
complement modern disciplinary penality but were vastly different in their logic
and technologies (Merry, 2001). The Manenberg case study suggests that this
attempt at spatial governmentality failed to dislodge the deeply embedded gang
structures and activities that have been fuelled by the shift of the Western Cape
economy from traditional manufacturing to a service and tourist-driven economy.
This troubling account from the Cape of Storms is yet another global warning
about the rough weather that awaits city planners and officials who uncritically
embrace the cyber vision of a globally competitive IT-driven Silicon Valley
economy at the tip of Africa.
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(see Bond (2000)). There is also a burgeoning South African urban studies literature that includes
Bremner (1994), Bond and Tait (1997), Crankshaw (1996), Hindson et al (1994), Huchzermeyer
(1999), Mabin (1991, 1992), Smith (1992), Parnell (1991), Swilling et al (1991), and Tomlinson
(1994). See chapters on urban citizenship and governance in Cape Town by Ivor Chipkin, Rafael
Marks, Elaine Salo, Andrew Spiegel, Shannon Jackson and Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood in
Robins (2003, forthcoming). Other recent studies on Cape Town include Vanessa Watson (1995),
Spiegel et al (1996, 1999) and Robins (2000).
2 Cape Town’s strategic surveillance unit, which operates the closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras
used to fight crime in the city centre and on the N1 highway, has recently begun to expand its
operation to include public places and roads in high-crime areas of the Cape Flats such as Manenberg.
The CCTV crime unit provides the police and city traffic department with visual information on crime,
informal trading, protest marches, advertising billboards and fire hazards. According to Ian Neilson,
the Cape Town unicity’s executive councillor for safety and health, the CCTV system will contribute
towards the process of developing Cape Town as a model global city (Cape Times, 24 January 2002).
3 Some 25 000 South Africans are killed annually as a result of violent crime, and South Africa is
regarded as being the murder and rape capital of the world. Following dramatic reporting of infant
rapes throughout the country in December 2001, President Mbeki called for a meeting with religious
leaders to discuss the breakdown in the moral fabric of the nation, while the former president, Nelson
Mandela, reiterated the widely held view that these infant rapes were linked to misguided beliefs
about cures for AIDS. This development followed the rise in the incidence of rapes of young girls by
men who believed having sex with a virgin could cure them of AIDS. Others ascribed these crimes to a
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complete collapse of the country’s moral fibre, itself attributed to the violent legacies of apartheid,
massive unemployment and poverty and a host of other factors (Sunday Times, 9 December 2001).
Sunday Times journalist Sechaba Ka’ Nkosi noted, for instance, that the profile of the mothers of the
raped infants was the same: poor, largely uneducated and single. Their ages ranged from late teens to
early 20s. They were usually unemployed. The perpetrators’  profile was similar: unemployed, young
and known to the mothers (Sunday Times, 9 December 2001). Yet again there was a loud call from
‘the public’ for the reintroduction of the death penalty, for tougher jail sentences and for communities
to be allowed to take the law into their own hands. The state was perceived by most citizens as unable
to control spiralling crime and violence.
4 The latter half of the 1990s witnessed a shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP), with its state-centric approach to development, to the ‘neoliberal’  Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. Patrick Bond (2000) suggests that the shift to GEAR was largely a
reaction to the perceived failure of the state to drive development and reconstruction during the 1990s,
and that this led to GEAR’s acknowledgement of the central role of the private sector in job creation
and development. As a result, GEAR promotes a more modest role for central government as facilitator
of development through public–private partnerships, privatisation, contractual outsourcing and the
decentralisation and devolution of competence to local government. It remains to be seen how these
procedures will affect citizens’  ability to access state resources and service delivery.
5 The global reach of neoliberalism— and the retreat of the developmental state—has also generated
more ‘conventional’  forms of associational life in South Africa, including the globally connected
NGOs, Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) and lobby groups. Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC), for example, successfully challenged international pharmaceutical companies and government
AIDS policies through the strategic use of the courts and national and international campaigns. In
addition, numerous cyber-connected environmental, media and anti-arms trade organisations have
entered into this newly emerging post-apartheid public sphere and global civil society.
6 At a Mowbray community policing forum, 14 November 2001, Ministry of Safety and Security,
Hennie Bester, spoke of the logistical headache the South African police have had to deal with in
attempting to fight ordinary criminal activity while having to commit resources to ongoing problems
of urban terror, taxi violence, gang drug trafficking and turf wars, criminal syndicates, and so on.
7 City of Cape Town, Manenberg Task Team Project Definition Report, Draft 1998-04-03, p 4.
8 Parts of this section appear in Robins (2000).
9 An article in the Cape Times on 5 March 1998 entitled ‘Cameras to watch over you: huge waterfront
security shake-up’ described the multi-million-rand security upgrading initiative following a shoot-out
between two shoplifters and security guards at Cape Town’s Waterfront shopping mall. Directly
opposite this front-page story was a large colour photograph of a grieving coloured woman, her eyes
blood red from crying. Her teenage son had been killed in a triple assassination at Clarke’s Estate, a
coloured neighbourhood in the Cape Flats. The caption read: ‘Violent death is nothing new in this
gang-ridden areas, but the triple killing has shocked the community … The police say they died in
Americans’ gang territory’ . Two weeks later four young men were killed at the entrance to the
Waterfront in what police described as yet another gang assassination. More surveillance cameras
were immediately installed at the Waterfront entrance and security was stepped up. The fear of the
spill-over of gang violence from the Cape Flats into the Waterfront prompted immediate action.
10 This violence has over the past few decades become naturalised and normalised through essentialist
discourses on a purported coloured predisposition towards violence and gangsterism. PAGAD and
representatives of community police forums sought to displace this normalising discourse by drawing
public attention to police corruption, inefficiency, inadequate resources, and the state’s alleged
indifference to the bloodbath on the Cape Flats.
11 For some of my University of the Western Cape (UWC) students who live in black and coloured
townships of the Flats, the safe spaces of recreation are mostly the malls in formerly white parts of the
city; however, they often cannot afford the transport costs of a taxi to the Waterfront or Cavendish
Square. The UWC students I interviewed, and who live in conflict-prone townships on the Cape Flats,
expressed powerful feelings of isolation, claustrophobia and incarceration in dangerous and bleak
spaces. This was especially the case for women, for whom the township streets can be hostile and
threatening places dominated by aggressive men and dangerous gangsters. For many male students,
who also experienced the township streets and shebeens as dangerous spaces, the only viable
alternative places of recreation to the shopping malls were sports venues and staying at home to watch
television and socialise with friends and family.
12 Ebenezer Howard’s ‘garden city’ was not meant to be a suburb but the antithesis of a suburb. It was
not a rural retreat but rather a synthesis or symbiosis between urban and rural: a compact garden city
would have ample open space, a park at its centre, and tree-lined boulevards and gardens surrounding
the housing. In its design the garden city shows a concern for amenity, pollution and resource
conservation. Cultural and leisure facilities are located centrally, for example the central park. The
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legacy of Howard’s ideas are green belts, protected agricultural land, low-density housing, industrial
trading estates, shopping centres and neighbourhood facilities (Pile et al, 1999: 254).
13 A key feature of these interventions has been the social and spatial separation of the middle class from
‘the poor’, and the creation of the private space of the home within which the nuclear family could be
nurtured and protected. According to Roger Silverstone (1997: 7; cf Pile et al, 1999: 31), this Euro-
American suburban culture was, and continues to be, highly gendered. It is built around an ideology
and a reality of women’s domestication and confinement to household work and the private domain.
Throughout Europe and North America, this suburban culture was buttressed by public policies, state
resources and media images that attempted ‘to resocialize women into the home, and into the bosom
of the nuclear bourgeois family’ (Silverstone, 1997: 7).
14 Staggie’s Hard Livings gang is based in Manenberg and has over the decades become one of the most
powerful crime syndicates, involved mostly in the drug trade, but it has also diversified into the sex
work and taxi industries.
15 See CCT Community Development Report on Urban Regeneration, 24 October 2000. The Manenberg
zone was identified as ‘the worse [sic] off in terms of poverty and dysfunctionality’ . The six zones of
poverty included  iSLP (Philippi, Crossroads, Nyanga and Browns Farm), Manenber g zone
(Gugulethu, Hanover Park, Heideveld and Manenberg), Langa, Kewtown, Woodstock/Salt River and
Mitchells Plain. The key social indicators for the Manenberg zone, Kewtown, Woodstock/Salt River
and Mitchells Plain, included ‘poor, high crime and dysfunctional’ .
16 Sometimes I will use ‘CCT officials’  to refer to both Devcom and CCT officials. I do this because the
Devcom team worked as part of a larger team that included CCT planners and officials from other CCT
departments.
17 A Cape Town Unicity task team recently warned of a looming financial crisis, with the city
authority’s debt soaring to a record R2.4 billion—equal to almost 40% of the city’s R9 billion budget.
A report compiled by the city’s credit control task team warned of debts rising by R700 million in
12 months and posing ‘real risks to the city’s financial integrity’  (Cape Metro, Sunday Times,
4 November 2001). The report noted that, seven years after the end of the civic protests and rent
boycotts against apartheid, ‘it is common knowledge that certain of our customers were encouraged
not to pay municipal accounts for services rendered and that council and its predecessors have been
involved in uphill battles to redress the consequences of those actions’ (Cape Metro, Sunday Times,
4 November 2001).
18 Chris Giles, Director of Self-Help Manenberg, a local NGO, believes that the police are completely ill-
equipped and inefficient and that governance in Manenberg requires blockades with soldiers similar to
the situation in Northern Ireland. He believes that this could be done if there was the political will to
deal with crime and violence. He suspects, however, that in many instances the police and politicians
are colluding with the underworld druglords and criminal syndicates. Giles suggested that legalising
drugs could bring the price down, and that this could contribute towards reducing the levels of
violence associated with the protection of supply lines and turf wars. The Minister of Safety and
Security, Hennie Bester, recently told residents of the Mowbray Community Policing Forum of the
extraordinary profits generated by the trade in ecstasy.
19 Manenberg residents interviewed in 2000 by Christoph Haferburg and UWC post-graduate students
called upon the Council to build more houses for residents who have been waiting on housing lists for
10–15 years. Respondents also insisted that the Council should repair its buildings and rental stock
and hand over Council houses and flats to tenants who have been paying rent for many years.
Residents also claimed that, while the Council provided basic services, it needed to do more to clean
the streets and Council housing in the area. The most frequent demand from residents was that the
Council needed to do more to eliminate gangsterism in Manenberg: ‘The Council is too passive with
regards to complaints of the residents here. We have complained about the shebeens but the Council
has done nothing so far. The Council have [sic] to bring discipline here in Manenberg. The police
must patrol the place properly … The place is full of gangsters. They must be gotten rid of. The
shebeens must be closed … The Council must be more visible to the community. Drugs are affecting
the community badly … The neighbourhood watch must come and patrol the area to protect us in
Sherwood Park … The Council must wipe out the gangsters.’
20 Report, Community Development, 1998-02-03, The Executive Committee, Manenberg Crisis.
21 City of Cape Town, Community Development ‘Status Report: Manenberg Crisis’ (2000-04-14).
22 City of Cape Town Manenberg Task Team Project Definition Report. Draft 1998-04-03.
23 Mitchell (1998) analyses these innovations as the vehicles of a modernist metaphysics that generates
the modern experience of meaning as a process of representation (p xiii). Mitchell’s analysis of world
exhibitions and urban planning in colonial Cairo focuses on the ‘modernist experience of the
real’ produced by the generation of what seems an unproblematic distinction between reality and its
representation.
24 The CCTM’s attempt to undermine these community-based gang cultures can be seen as part of a more
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general process whereby ‘community-consciousness’  is first made through residential differentiation
(along class, ethnic and race lines) and then destroyed in the name of the national interest and capital
accumulation (Harvey, 1985: 123). As David Harvey notes, ‘Community consciousness with all of its
parochialisms, once created becomes deeply embedded, and it becomes just as difficult to piece it
together in a configuration appropriate to the national interest (as perceived from the standpoint of
capital accumulation) as it is to transform it into a class-consciousness antagonistic to the perpetuation
of the capitalist order. In order, therefore, to maintain its own dynamic, capitalism is forced to disrupt
and destroy what it initially created as part of its own strategy for self-preservation. Communities
have to be disrupted by speculative activity, growth must occur, and whole residential neighbour-
hoods must be transformed to meet the needs of capital accumulation. Herein lie both the contra-
dictions and the potentials for social transformation in the urbanization at this stage in our history’
(Harvey, 1985: 123).
25 Advocates of both the new public management and the community participation models claim
to depart from the ‘traditional’  public sector model, which is seen to be highly rule-bound and
hierarchical and built around centralised power and authority. During the 1990s the traditional model
of bureaucracy, inherited from the apartheid era was vigorously attacked by both the Left and the
Right for being wasteful, inefficient, hierarchical and outmoded. In addition, it was seen to be
incapable of dealing with complexities, uncertainties and contingencies by virtue of being pre-
programmed through inflexible, standardised procedures. It was within this management policy
scenario that the CCTM embarked upon a public–private partnership low-income housing development
scheme in Manenberg.
26 During the French Revolution it was possible to ‘liberate individuals’  and create a ‘new universal
citizen’ by eliminating all existing identities. According to Manuel Castells, France is probably the
only country in the world that has been able to achieve this extermination of identities other than the
French identity. According to Castells, ‘the French model became the most effective model in
building the citizen identity, which is an identity which is abstracted from any other historical group
except the state, the democratic state’ (2000: 8).
27 CCT Community Development Report, Urban Regeneration, 24 October 2000.
28 This was particularly evident in the garment industry where, despite a boom in clothing and textile
exports in 2001, the SA Clothing and Textile Worker’s Union (SACTWU) reported the loss of an
average of 1400 formal jobs a month. Factory closures in the clothing sector, Cape Town’s biggest
employer, wreaked havoc for Manenberg women traditionally recruited into the garment industry. In
the first 10 months of 2001, 19 companies shut their doors resulting in the loss of 2249 jobs in the
clothing sector (Cape Argus, 29 October 2001). As the Cape Argus reported, ‘Thousands of jobs lost
in city rag trade exodus to seek cheap rural labour.’
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